Outline - Civil Procedure - VI - Pleadings

Civil Procedure (2005-2006)

VI. PLEADINGS

A. Complaint

1. Common Law – Writs; filing the wrong one gets case dismissed; retain:

a. Law vs. equity for jury right

b. Equity requirement of no adequate remedy at law

c. Equity defenses of laches and unclean hands

2. Code Pleading – Allowed for pleading in the alternative; retain:

a. Merger of law and equity

b. Single form of action

c. Primacy of merits over procedure

d. Still kept in some form in New York and California

3. Modern Pleading – FRCivP

a. 8(a) Minimum requirements

i. (identification of parties – Rule 10)

ii. short and plain statement for jurisdiction

iii. short and plain statement of the claim

iv. demand for judgment

b. 8(e)(2) Alternative claims allowed, even if inconsistent [McCormick v. Kopmann]

c. 8(f) Construe for substantial justice [Conley v. Gibson]

d. 10 Captions, paragraphs, exhibits

e. 12(b)(6) Failure to state claim may be grounds for motion to dismiss

f. 12(e) Motion for more definite statement (factual sufficiency)

4. Special Pleading

a. Courts may not require a heightened pleading standard except in cases of fraud or mistake [Leatherman]

b. In California, where causation is not obvious, plaintiff must plead how conduct of each defendant was substantial factor in causing or prolonging injury. [Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical, Inc.]

c. Must state special damages.

B. Responding to Complaint

1. Types of responses

a. Denials (answer)

b. Defenses (answer)

c. Demurrers (pre-answer motion or answer)

d. Lack of jurisdiction or improper venue (pre-answer motion or answer, whichever is filed first)

e. Counterclaim (answer)

f. Procedural defenses (answer or pretrial motion)

2. Pre-Answer Motion

a. Structure

i. Notice of the motion

ii. Motion itself

iii. Certificate of service

iv. Memorandum in support

v. Affidavit

b. Rules

i. 12(b)(6) – Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (demurrer)

ii. 12(c) – Motion for judgment on the pleadings (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim after pleadings are closed)

iii. 12(e) – Motion for more definite statement

iv. 12(g) – Must raise all available Rule 12 defenses/objections in 1^st pre-Answer motion

v. 12(h)(1) – Lack of PJ

vi. 12(h)(2) – Failure to join necessary Rule 19 party

vii. 12(h)(3) – Lack of SMJ

viii. 56 – Motion for summary judgment

3. Answer

a. Timing

i. 12(a)(1) – 20 days after service or 60 days after request for waiver of service, but

ii. 12(a)(4) – Denial of a Rule 12 Motion extends Answer deadline to 10 days after denial

b. Minimum substantive requirements for notice

i. Admit, deny, or state lack of sufficient information to form a belief as to truth, of each & every factual averment in Complaint (failure to specifically deny = admit)

ii. All affirmative defenses

iii. All waivable defenses unless already waived or asserted by prior Motion to Dismiss

iv. Any counterclaims or cross-claims

c. Cases

i. Fuentes v. Tucker – Where drunk driver amended answer, admitting liability, evidence of inebriation was introduced in error, but was harmless.

ii. Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers, Inc. – Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied; where defendant did not contest injury or fact of collision, a general denial was not effective where the fact at issue was agency.

iii. Microsoft v. Halifax – If client has reason to know something is true, don’t deny; but if opposing party controls information, deny.

iv. Ingraham v. United States – Defendant may not “lie behind a log” and ambush plaintiff with unexpected defense; all affirmative defenses must be made in Answer or amended Answer.

d. Defenses

i. Must be in pleading or amended pleading under Rule 8(c): Defenses under Rules 9 and 12, laches, statutes of limitations, exclusion from insurance policy coverage, assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, duress, truth of defamation, fraud, illegality, failure of consideration, statutes of frauds, payment, release, waiver, arbitration & award, res judicata, estoppel, immunity, statutory cap, statutory exclusion

ii. Should be in pleading: Any defense that may be an affirmative defense

C. Policing the Pleadings – Always do this!

1. Rule 11(b) – Representations to Court

a. (1) No improper purpose

b. (2) Warranted by existing law or nonfrivolous argument to change law

c. (3) Factual allegations supported by evidence

d. (4) Factual denials warranted by evidence

2. Rule 11(c) – Sanctions

a. (1) Initiation

i. (A) By motion, served but not filed if withdrawn or corrected within 21 days

ii. (B) Sua sponte (no 21-day safe harbor)

b. (2) Nature and limitations – some or all of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred as part of violation

i. (A) Non-monetary for violation of (b)(2)

ii. (B) Monetary penalty to court

3. Reasonable Inquiry

a. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises – Firm and client sanctioned for not looking into grounds for copyright suit

b. Kraemer v. Grant County – Where opposition held all information, which would not come out until discovery, relying on client is reasonable and permissible

4. Improper Purpose [Saltany v. Reagan, Saltany v. Bush – Where there is a violation of Rule 11, there must be sanctions; the federal courts are not a forum for “protest” suits that have no merit]

5. Warranted by Existing Law – Rule 11 requires only “outline of a case” [Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Federation – As long as each claim is supported and has been investigated and researched before filing, no sanctions]

6. Reasonable Denials – Rule 11 sanctions appropriate where defendant has no reasonable basis for motion for summary judgment [Committe v. Dennis Reimer Co., LPA – Defendant who waved PJ cannot motion for summary judgment for lack of PJ; attorney’s fees not granted to pro se plaintiff, but other expenses are]

D. Amending the Pleadings – Always check this

1. Philosophy – Liberal rules for amending pleadings; spirit to decide cases on merits instead of pleadings. [Foman v. Davis – Woman who was promised inheritance allowed to amend complaint to assert claim in quantum meruit]

2. Rule 15(a) – Amendments

a. Can amend any time before answer is served.

b. Can amend within 20 days after answer is served.

c. After 20 days, must get court or opponent’s consent.

d. Opponent must respond in time left for original pleading or within 10 days after service of amended pleading, whichever is longer, unless court orders otherwise. [Nelson v. Adams USA Inc., et al. – Plaintiff cannot amend complaint to add sole shareholder of a company as an individual and to move for summary judgment simultaneously]

e. Court will decide motion for leave to amend on same standard as motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

f. Factors

i. Undue delay?

ii. Improper motive?

iii. Undue prejudice?

iv. Futile?

3. Rule 15(b) – Amendments to Conform to the Evidence

a. If extra issue tried without objection, implied consent to amend

b. Not necessary to amend to conform to evidence

c. If objection raised, standard to amend freely for merits, unless opponent prejudiced (which court can cure via continuance)

4. Rule 15(c) – Relation Back of Amendments

a. When permitted by statute of limitations; or

b. When new claim or defense arose from same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, or

c. Can change party asserted against if:

i. Arose from same conduct, transaction, or occurrence; and

ii. Within time period of Rule 4(m) (120 days of filing original complaint), new party [Zielinski v. PPI]

a) had notice (so not prejudiced)

b) knew or should have known of mistaken identity

d. Barcume v. City of Flint – Female police officers’ claims for alleged discriminatory employment practices relate back, but claims for alleged sexual harassment do not.

i. New claim based on same events relates back

ii. New facts regarding same events relate back

iii. New claim based on new events does not relate back

[lawschool] [outline] [civil_procedure] [due_process]

Outline - Civil Procedure - V - Choice of Law

Civil Procedure (2005-2006)

V. CHOICE OF LAW

1. History
   1. Swift v. Tyson
      1. Claims created by federal codified law, federal law
      2. Claims created by state codified law, state law and state court interpretations
      3. Common law claims, “general” substantive federal common law
   2. Taxicab – A company reincorporated in a different state and brought suit in federal court, which was thought more friendly to businesses than state courts, whose judges are elected
   3. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins – Overturned Swift, and declared that there would be no federal common law.
2. Erie Doctrine

   Rule	Choice of Law	Authority
   Standard of care	State law	Erie (1938)
   Conflict of laws	State law	Klaxon (1941)
   Statute of limitations	State law	York (1945)
   Burden of proof	State law	Cities Service Oil v. Dunlap
   Burden of pleading	Federal	Palmer v. Hoffman
   Discovery	Federal	Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
   Venue transfers and forum selection	Federal	Stewart v. Ricoh
   Agreement to arbitrate	State law	Bernhardt v. Polygraphic

3. Erie Today

   	Federal Court	State Court
   Federal statutory or Constitutional claim	Substance: federal Procedure: federal	Substance: federal Procedure: state
   State statutory, Constitutional, or common law claim	Substance: state Procedure: federal	Substance: state Procedure: state

4. Distinguishing Substantive and Procedural Law
   1. Conflicts of laws – State rules apply [Erie]
   2. Outcome determination – If a law affects the outcome, it is substantive, and state law must be applied. [Guaranty Trust Co. v. York – Statute of limitations is substantive]
   3. Balancing test [Byrd – Allocation of roles of judge and jury is essential to federal system, so federal law applies]:
      1. If federal interest greater than state interest, and probability of outcome determinancy is low, federal law applies
      2. If federal interest is less than state interest, and probability of outcome determinancy is high, state law applies
   4. Hanna Test – Where a Federal Rule covers same issue as state law, unless ex ante Federal Rule appears to alter substantive rights or to be outcome determinative, use Federal Rule. Note: This displaces York’s outcome determination test and Byrd’s balancing test. [Hanna – Rule 4 enforces substantive rights and does not alter them; Rule 4 complies with REA and is thus an Act of Congress, so RDA and Erie don’t apply]

[lawschool] [outline] [civil_procedure] [due_process]

Write-On Competition - Part III - Congratulations

I was not successful in my application, but congratulations to those who made it!

[lawschool] [law_review]

Speeches and Debates

Congressman William Jefferson's contention, that all materials in his office are immune from searches and seizures, has been struck down by Federal District Judge Thomas F. Hogan as an improper interpretation of the Speeches and Debates Clause (U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 6). (Judge Hogan's opinion is here in PDF format.) The Conclusion follows:

The facts and questions of law presented here are indeed unprecedented. It is well-established, however, that a Member of Congress is generally bound to the operation of the criminal laws as are ordinary persons. The Speech or Debate Clause does not “make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516. Members of Congress are not “exempt[] . . . from liability or process in criminal cases.” Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626.

The existing broad protections of the Speech or Debate Clause – absolute immunity from prosecution or suit for legislative acts and freedom from being “questioned” about those acts (including privilege from the testimonial act of producing documents in response to a subpoena) – satisfy the fundamental purpose of the Clause to protect the independence of the legislature. The Court declines to extend those protections further, holding that the Speech or Debate Clause does not shield Members of Congress from the execution of valid search warrants. Congressman Jefferson’s interpretation of the Speech or Debate privilege would have the effect of converting every congressional office into a taxpayer-subsidized sanctuary for crime. Such a result is not supported by the Constitution or judicial precedent and will not be adopted here. See Williamson v. United States, 28 S. Ct. at 167 (“[T]he laws of this country allow no place or employment as a sanctuary for crime.”) (quotation omitted).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court has found that the search executed on Congressman Jefferson’s congressional office was constitutional, as it did not trigger the Speech or Debate Clause privilege, did not offend the principle of the separation of powers, and was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion for return of property. An appropriate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

This seems to bear out what I had written:

It seems to me that Jefferson's Complaint claims not so much that he is protected by the privilege from Arrest than that his office is immune to searches and seizures because searches and seizures should be interpreted as questioning him about his legislative operations.

...

My guess is that no judge will grant absolute immunity of the sort Jefferson seems to be looking for. I also don't think any judge will lay down an exact rule as to how a search may be conducted. If anything, the court would probably issue a guideline or a balancing test to help future judges decide whether or not appropriate precautions have been and will be taken before signing off on a warrant.

Judge Hogan's conclusion seems reasonable, and consistent with what I know of Constitutional Law. If appealed, I highly doubt his ruling will be overturned. At most, it may be remanded for further consideration, if a higher court does formulate a newer guideline.

[constitution]

Write-On Competition - Part II - Smooth Sailing

I woke up just before 11am yesterday. I touched up my paper just a bit, and then proceeded to run the course of errands to lead to the submission. The plan was to go to school, print out the paper, go to Staples for envelopes, and then back to school to submit the paper. Since I was going to need to drive to Staples, I figured on driving to school, too, even though it was within easy walking distance.

But the streets around school were closed off for media equipment vehicles. Apparently, Nissan is doing a photo shoot for the 2007 Sentra. There was, in fact, a dark red one right on the quad; they were using the Fritz B. Burns Academic Center, designed by Frank Gehry, as the backdrop. I had to park the car back at the condo, and walk to school after all.

The printing went off without a hitch. Not too many people were at the computer lab. Afterward, I went to the Information Center, which is also the student mail center, and purchased some 2-cent stamps. (I so infrequently buy stamps, the post office always raises rates before I'm done with a book of stamps.) Then, I went back to the library to make photocopies of two pages in the information package that needed to be turned in with the paper. Finally, I went to the campus bookstore to purchase the 10x13 manila envelopes I needed to put the papers in.

Total cost: $1.34.

And now I can relax, and enjoy my trip to Chicago.

[lawschool] [law_review]

Write-On Competition - Part I - $0.12/page

Although the Law Review write-on competition package was issued last Monday, I didn't really begin to read it until this past weekend. By Sunday, I had finished reading only the first case, about 17 pages. The yesterday, at Borders Westwood, I managed to crank out another 50 pages. Today, I finished the whole dang thing. I admit I skipped most of the footnotes in Professor La Fave's treatise, but I can always return to those later if I need to. For now, the important thing is, I'm done reading.

By the way, the $25 application fee for 205 pages of reading comes out to just over $0.12/page. For that price you'd think the copies would be neater. But you didn't hear that from me.

[lawschool] [law_review]

"They shall in all Cases ..."

Finals season is over, but all is not quiet in Law Law Land. It is now time for the write-on competition for positions on the school's journals, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review. The subject just so happens to involve Amendment IV, which came up obliquely as part of another topic I've been keeping my eye on lately: The raid of Congressman William Jefferson's offices.

I won't get into the nitty gritty of the particular events, but I wanted to recall a conversation I had with an online friend lately. The friend had said, in part, the following:

Whether or not the warrant is valid is a separate issue from whether or not the search is allowed ab initio. The warrant could have been perfectly valid and any special procedures could have been followed and the search could still be entirely illegal per AI S6.

This is what I wrote in response:

Hrm. Let me restate what I think you're saying: Regardless of whether or not procedures are in place and followed in order to separate Speeches and Debates material from material required for a major criminal investigation (specifically, AIS6 excepts "Treason, Felon and Breach of the Peace"), the presence of Speeches and Debates material exempts all other materials in the office.

If I'm misunderstanding you, skip the rest of this post and correct me.

If I'm not misunderstanding you, we have 2 issues raised by that interpretation:

1. Are there ever any circumstances in which a MoC's office can be searched? What about in case of a bomb scare, in which officers (presumably led by Capitol Police, who report to Congress, but possibly including ATF and/or FBI officers, who report ultimately to the Executive) are called about a possible bomb in one of the offices? Such a thing was unfolding this morning when someone reported that there were gunshots at the Rayburn House Office Building. Capitol Police fielded the call, but FBI were involved as well.

   If there are some circumstances in which a MoC's office can be searched, what might pose such a circumstance?
   

2. AIS6 poses the following (as you're aware):

   They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

   Notice:

   1. The privilege from Arrest has nothing to do with "Speech or Debate".
      
   2. The exceptions come first. So where a major crime is involved, there is no privilege.
      
   3. Nowhere does it mention an extraordinary privilege from searches and seizures, except possibly with regard to Speeches and Debates.

It seems to me that Jefferson's Complaint claims not so much that he is protected by the privilege from Arrest than that his office is immune to searches and seizures because searches and seizures should be interpreted as questioning him about his legislative operations.

From there, I can see another way of getting to your conclusion, that validity of warrant is irrelevant. The core issue, as proposed by Jefferson, seems to be: Searches and seizures of an office which holds legislative material should be interpreted as questioning his speech and debate material.

I think there is definitely an issue of law there. A judge must then consider the practical effects.

1. If he agrees with the interpretation (i.e., a search of an office, regardless of the target and regardless of procedure, is an unrebuttable per se violation of AIS6), then the following becomes true:
   1. Jefferson wins.
      
   2. Any Member of Congress can hide evidence of treason and felony in his office and claim immunity.
      
   3. There would be new issues as to what exigencies, if any, can justify any searches. (That goes back to the item about today's reported gunfire.)
2. If he disagrees with the interpretation (i.e., a search of an office, regardless of the target and regardless of procedure, is an unrebuttable per se violation of AIS6), then the following needs to be resolved:
   1. Must searches and seizures be limited to Capitol Police, which report to the Congress?
      
   2. May Executive Branch officers ever be involved (considering the FBI's heavy involvement in D.C., it probably would not be practicable to exclude Executive Branch officers entirely)?
      
   3. Under what circumstances may Executive Branch officers be involved? (Presumably, only when the Judiciary signs off on a warrant; i.e., no unilateral action by the Executive Branch.)
      
   4. Under what circumstances, if any, may a Judicial Branch officer sign off on a search?

My guess is that no judge will grant absolute immunity of the sort Jefferson seems to be looking for. I also don't think any judge will lay down an exact rule as to how a search may be conducted. If anything, the court would probably issue a guideline or a balancing test to help future judges decide whether or not appropriate precautions have been and will be taken before signing off on a warrant.

Day After

By the time the Constitutional Law final rolled around, it was getting a bit anticlimactic. Apparently, Sections 1 and 2 had our finals around the same time (in the afternoon) -- and apparently, the questions were very nearly the same. That should not come as a huge surprise: Dean Burcham, who taught Con Law to Section 2, had himself taken Con Law with Professor May, who taught Section 1 this year.

Around 5pm, after we had all packed up our laptops and milled out to the quad, we were greeting each other as 2Ls. Some of us decided to head over to the Daily Grill at the southeast corner of Flower and 6th in Downtown Los Angeles.

But the real festivities were yet to come! Genevieve Walser-Jolly, a bona fide 2L, had arranged to reserve Hollywood Club Day After for a special shindig for all Loyola Law School students and their friends and tagalongs. The club was at the famed interesection of Hollywood and Highland.

Update: (2006.05.30.11:10 PDT) FormosanWonderBoy has pictures, including the interesting case of the Girls Who Can't Take a Straight Picture With Him.

A Last Meal

So this is what Law Law Stud is having for the last meal before the last final of my first year:

1. Beef, marinated with spicy sesame seed oil, Worcestershire sauce, pinch of sugar, pinch of salt, some red chili peppers, black pepper, crushed basil, and chopped garlic.
2. Bottle of Heineken.

Yeehaw!

[lawschool] [finals]

Legal Continuity

Lexington Green of Chicago Boyz has an excellent post on the continuities between English and American law. I know it's finals time, but it's worth reading when you get a chance.

[law]

So It Begins

The final stretch of the first year of law school is upon us! Section Two does battle with the Property final starting in nine hours. I finished my outline about six hours ago. The question is, can Law Law Stud survive? Stay tuned!

[lawschool] [finals]

Finals

As the first year draws to an end, Law Law Stud will probably not be posting very much. Grades from the end of the first semester, and from the contracts midterm, have generally left something to be desired. Law Law Stud will also not be posting outlines online, because we prefer to do it manually (old school HTML hack here), so it takes too much time, and because the outline may fluctuate between posting and exam times.

Here is a fond and heartfelt wishes for the best for all of the 1Ls that have made an impact. And, for those in Section Two that were just a little disturbed by the decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), check out what the City of Anaheim has been up to. Good luck, everyone!

[lawschool] [finals]

Barristers Ball

On Saturday 15 April 2006, The Musix Box was closed for a private event. Dozens upon dozens of Loyola Law School Students converged upon the old Henry Fonda Theater for the 2006 Barristers Ball. As the last two weeks of instruction for the school year drew upon the weary partygoers, the Ball gave the hardworking students a chance to see their friends in their finery, and not talk about law. The exhortation was to "dress to impress", and those that came most certainly did!

For pictures, see Nam's pictures on Flickr.

Music Box is at 6126 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA. There is a transparent tent over the roof so people can lounge there, but the downstairs bartender serves stiffer drinks.

Update: (2006.04.21.21.18 PDT) FormosanWonderBoy has posted up his own account of the Barristers Ball.

Update: (2006.05.05.23:45 PDT) More pictures here.

Birthday at Ma'Kai

Nam celebrated his birthday over the weekend, and invited all of Section 2 to join him, in addition to some friends from UCLA and elsewhere, at Ma'Kai. And what a turnout it was! For pictures, check out Nam's pictures on Flickr.

Ma'Kai is located at 101 Broadway, Santa Monica, CA. A Long Island Iced Tea will run you $14 before tip, but a pint of Guinness goes for $6 before tip, and fills you up too.

Turf Club - Part V

It was again the last turf club of the semester this past Thursday! This time around, there were some well-dressed people milling about, 1Ls getting ready for their oral arguments.

Happy Birthday, Krystle!

Law Law Stud is not usually in the habit of keeping track of everybody's birthdays. However, last Tuesday, 4 April, was a special exception. The Stud's study partner, Krystle, edged a little closer to being able to rent a car without mandatory insurance. So the Stud, and a few friends, managed to surprise Krystle with ... an ice cream cake!!

One more year before the quarter century, girl!

Oral Arguments

Many 1Ls got their first taste of litigation last week, as we headed for oral arguments based on Graded III. My experience was that it was great to see everyone all dressed up, and to have an opportunity to start growing into the shoes we'll be wearing once we're out of law school.

I prepared a little bit by reading opposing counsel's brief for about an hour before going in for arguments. He had made some references that I couldn't find. I re-read the case and couldn't quite figure out how he came to the conclusion that he did, especially when he point-cited it. Most of my hour was spent doing that.

Just before going in, I went to the library to print out a copy of my own brief so I'd have notes to go on. As I read through it, I noticed that the highlights on my citations actually showed up despite the black-and-white printer. That means the papers I'd turned in also had the highlights. D'oh!

After listening to Oshin practice his prepared speech, I felt my confidence drop quite a bit. All I had to go on was my portrayal of the defendant, a fictional university motioning for summary judgment in a Title IX sex discrimination action. ("Illinois Southeast University has a history of providing an enriching and rewarding college experience to all its students; and in the early 1970s, we extended those opportunities by providing an athletic program.") Fortunately, opposing counsel seemed eager to get it over with, and wasn't looking for a real duel. The judge was also quite congenial, and helped us along with some of the questions.

I didn't get the shakes; that lectern was a good psychological stabilizer. Knowing that it was there for me to grab on to if I had to, I didn't actually shake so much. I gave myself a mental pinch for every time I said "um" or "uh", and found my brain far less bruised than I had thought it would be. The judge noted that I would sometimes look off to the right. I replied that, according to an article I'd read somewhere, when a person is looking off to his dominant side, he is trying to recall something; when he is looking off to her other side, he is trying to make something up. The judge thought that was interesting.

Unfortunately, the case was designed to be arguable in both directions, which means that the defense's motion for summary judgment would pretty much inevitably fail, for those who were curious. I was not so curious; I was caught up in the high of swinging at all the judge's questions. He had one interesting note for me: He thought that I adequately answered one of his questions, even though I prefaced the answer with "I'm not completely sure", or other words to that effect.

When I came out, I shared war stories with others from my Legal Writing class. I would say that Craig, Carolyn T., and Renee were the most enthused. Craig and Carolyn were now quite sure that litigation is the path they would want to go. While I wouldn't say that I had quite that experience, I would say that I now at least am willing to consider litigation, where before I had been dead set on doing more transactional work.

Hope everybody else had a fun time!

[lawschool]

Wit of Mandamus II

April began with a great show here at Loyola Law School. Members of the LLS community, including students, alumni, and even professors, put on the second annual variety show, Wit of Mandamus II.

I won't include the entire program, but having signed up recently for an account with YouTube, I can share some of the video clips from my Canon Powershot S70:

Here's John Pham playing one of his original pieces, "Supernatural":

Here's Student Bar Association presidential candidate Scott Wilson playing "Soul Meets Body":

Musical Director Cameron Fredman (2L) and Assistant Director Jonathan Stout (1L, Section 2!) jam together in "All of Me":

Professor Jay Dougherty also had a chance to jam with Jonathan, in "Minor Swing":

Professor Dougherty then showed off his amazing skills during a bridge to Stephen Cawelti's rendition of "Hey Hey, My My":

For the final act, Grace Lim treated the crowd to "Walkin' After Midnight", accompanied by Cameron (piano), Justin Goodman (tenor sax), Professor Dougherty (electric guitar), Jonathan (drums), and Professor Allan Ides (electric bass):

This has been only a glimpse of the fun from that night. If you missed out this year, be sure to make it next year!

Bar Review - V - Brass Monkey

I have a minor confession: I haven't been to every bar review this school year. I missed the first one; but it's okay, because last week, the last bar review of the year was held at the first venue of the year: Brass Monkey.

Like-minded Loyola Law students turned out en masse for this last bar review. Section 3 in particular represented. Section 2 was not without representation, though; other than myself, there was the ubiquitous Shani, as well as Alex P., who brought his brother; Amos, Renee, and Dan K. put in an appearance for all of 10 minutes; and Nam resumed his everpresence.

[lawschool] [Brass Monkey]

"Graded III"

It sounds so innocuous when we call it that: "Graded III". It has been, however, anything but innocuous.

Spring Break had begun with some fun times at Tom Bergin's. But once Spring Break began, it was time to start working this, the third graded assignment for our Legal Writing class. Every day, it was time to start working on it. I started working on it on Monday. Then Tuesday. Then Wednesday.

By the time Friday rolled around, I had gotten going, and felt I had a good grip on the case. By the time I went out on Saturday, I had a skeleton of my arguments. Today (Sunday ... very very very very late Sunday night) I fleshed it all out with citations and a few comparisons here and there. I fear this won't exactly be Dante's Inferno, but I feel as if I've been living in purgatory this week, and maybe some higher level of hell.

Tomorrow, it's time to print. And it's time to read over my handiwork to check for minor mistakes. It could be the difference between a C+ and a B-, after all. And it's time to work on my table of contents, because it doesn't seem Microsoft really appreciates that lawyers need to underline things for our outlines.

I feel bad for all the professors with Monday classes. I don't think anybody will be awake. Despite all the advice we were given, to try to do the work before Spring Break, my intuition is that we all procrastinated until the last few days. Oh sure, some of us might have started early. But few started getting heavily involved until the last few days. Anyway, time to catch a couple of hours of shut eye. I'll see everyone in class in ... just over 5 hours from now.

Ciao!

[lawschool]