Showing posts with label evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label evidence. Show all posts

Friday, July 17, 2009

California Supreme Court: Breathalyzer Test Not Enough In Se

The California Supreme Court seems now to be saying that blowing a 0.08 is not enough in itself to warrant a DUI arrest. This is nothing new to DUI lawyers, of course.

Thursday, January 15, 2009

The Exclusionary Rule Under Attack?

Those of you who have taken Criminal Procedure know about the exclusionary rule. The point of the rule was to prevent law enforcement and prosecution from getting the benefit of fruit of unlawful conduct. One of the major points is that law enforcement officers must be able to develop probable cause (of the type that would be sufficient for a warrant) before they can arrest an individual. Absent such probable cause, the arrest is unlawful, and evidence obtained as a result of that arrest, such as by a search, is thereby tainted, and cannot be used against the suspect at trial. Because the focus is on balancing prevention of unlawful conduct on the part of police on the one hand with justice on the other, one exception to the rule requiring the existence of probable cause, as developed over the years, is reasonable error on the part of judicial staff, e.g., a court clerk pulling the wrong arrest record or criminal record because of an input error in the computer record retrieval system.

In its just-announced opinion in the case of Herring v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that reasonable error in police record keeping triggers an exception to the exclusionary rule. The New York Times reports on the underlying facts:

The case began when methamphetamines and a gun were found after Bennie D. Herring, an Alabama man, was arrested based on police officers’ mistaken belief that he was subject to an outstanding arrest warrant.

That belief was based on incorrect information in the computer files of a neighboring county’s police department. The warrant had been withdrawn, but the database had not been updated.

Calling the error “isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,” Chief Justice Roberts said the lower courts had been correct in allowing the jury in Mr. Herring’s case to consider the evidence. He was convicted and sentenced to 27 months in prison.

The ruling itself is relatively narrow and is arguably merely a logical extension of a 1995 decision, Arizona v. Evans, which recognized an exception to the exclusionary rule for arrests resulting from erroneous computer records kept by court employees (as opposed to the police).

Tom Goldstein, one of Mr. Herrings defense lawyers, gave a more fleshed-out analysis at SCOTUSblog:

On its facts, the case is about the application of the exclusionary rule to errors in police recordkeeping. Narrowly framed, the question was whether the Court’s prior ruling that errors by judicial clerks do not trigger the exclusionary rule should be applied to police clerks. The Court holds that a negligent error by the police clerk does not give rise to exclusion. The dissents dispute the majority’s reasoning within that frame of reference - i.e., they treat the case as if it were only about police clerks and police recordkeeping.

But in fact the majority’s reasoning is broader - much, much broader. Today, the Supreme Court holds that negligent errors by the police generally do not trigger the exclusionary rule. “As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Slip Op. at 9. “[W]e conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements,” the exclusionary rule does not apply. Id. at 12.

The opinion has nothing to do with the fact that the error here is one of recordkeeping. It applies fully to negligence by police officers in their day-to-day determination whether there is probable cause to conduct a search. If the officer makes an objectively reasonable mistake - i.e., he is merely negligent - the exclusionary rule does not apply to whatever evidence he finds. Put another way, the Supreme Court today extended the good faith exception to ordinary police conduct.

The facts of the case, as described in these two articles, does not seem to suggest that there was bad faith on the part of Alabama police. However, one potential problem with extending the exception to police is that an agency, or some of its personnel, may become less careful, secure in the knowledge that good faith alone is sufficient to sustain use of evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. That would seriously impede the development and professionalism of our law enforcement agencies.

Thursday, June 12, 2008

Habeas Corpus: Boumedine v. Bush

The United States Supreme Court has handed down its ruling in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. ____ (2008) (PDF) (hat-tip: SCOTUSblog, in which petitioners, alien enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay, challenged the Military Commissions Act. As most of you should be well aware, the Supreme Court, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), held that U.S. citizens who were apprehended in the battlefield as enemy combatants, and subsequently held on U.S. soil, had a right to the due process privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, i.e., had a right to be informed of the charges against them. This, despite the fact that the government could label them enemy combatants, and as a result, hold them for the duration of hostilities (which is open to very broad interpretation, with the Supreme Court traditionally, but not always, showing much deference to the President).

Left unclear was the question of whether or not non-citizens apprehended abroad could exercise the privilege of the writ.

In today's opinion, Justice Kennedy first acknowledges that the Military Commissions Act does expressly deny federal courts jurisdiction in cases where detainees petition for the writ. However, the Court holds that this was not a proper exercise of Congress' power under the Suspension Clause. Kennedy discusses the history of the writ, noting that its evolution was "painstaking, even by the centuries-long measures of English constitutional history." Kennedy then considers the intent of the Framers in including the clause, by examining an exchange at the Virgina ratifying convention, in which Edmund Randolph referred to the Suspension Clause as an "exception" to the "power given to Congress to regulate courts." Kennedy also notes the words of Alexander Hamilton, whose positions are usually at odds with Virginians (notably Thomas Jefferson and James Madison), in The Federalist No. 84, in which Hamilton approvingly quotes Blackstone for the proposition that because imprisonment is a more dangerous way of depriving a man of his liberty because it is less conspicuous than confiscation of his property or execution of capital punishment, the writ of habeas corpus was the bulwark of individual liberty.

All very well and good, you may say, and one can certainly see that citizens would be covered. But what about foreign nationals?

In a somewhat confusing history lesson on the meaning of "foreign", citing examples from 18th and 19th Century British practice, Justice Kennedy concludes that the formal status of a territory as "foreign" or not was irrelevant; what was relevant was the effect of the sovereign's laws. That is, although Scotland and England were one after 1707, English law, for whatever reasons, did not run in Scotland, while it did run in Ireland, even though Ireland was ruled under a separate crown (in theory). Accordingly, the write applied in Ireland, but not in Scotland. From there, Kennedy makes the argument that because federal law is unlikely to be disregarded at Guantánamo, and because Cuban courts have no jurisdiction there, federal law runs there, and therefore the writ applies there as well, regardless of the nationality of the petitioner.

I'm skipping over some of the analysis, because the opinion, not including dissents and concurrences, runs to 70 pages, and I'm in the middle of bar review. Suffice it to say that Kennedy finds that Congress has not satisfied the Suspension Clause by providing an adequate substitute. An adequate substitute, according to Kennedy, is one which accords a reviewing court the means to correct errors, which may arise even in procedures that comply with structural demands. (After all, Kennedy notes, if simple compliance with structural demands was enough, there would be no point to habeas corpus proceedings subsequent to fair trials. LLS--As a summer clerk for a judge in the criminal courts in downtown Los Angeles last year, I came across many habeas petitions which I had to answer. At least some of them raised facts that were not known at the time of trial, nor reasonably knowable to the defense, but which were material to the outcome. That is what Justice Kennedy means when he refers to correcting errors.) Kennedy makes the point that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal process is more accusatorial than adversarial, which cuts against the point of habeas corpus by taking away the means of the court to discover evidence that would have been material but which was not known or reasonably knowable to the defense.

Without reading the rest of the opinion, I should think that this is an important case, because of its potential impact on how the judicial process in the so-called "war on terror" is conducted.

Saturday, March 08, 2008

Evidence: You've Gotta Be Kidding Me!

While observing prelims today, the Stud came across an interesting objection by the defense attorney. The victim-witness was testifying to the underlying facts, including how the defendant had struck her with a vehicle and kept driving on.

Witness: Then she hit her gas and her car hit me--

Defense: Objection! Speculation! Lacks foundation! Witness is not qualified to give her opinion!

The judge gave the defense attorney an incredulous look, and the witness had this terrific look on her face as if to say, "You've got to be kidding me!"

For those who are taking evidence, the reason for this is that, while normally opinion testimony is reserved for experts, there are various things for which a lay witness can form an opinion. For example, if someone appeared drunk, it is within the ambit of lay experience. The examining attorney may have to rephrase the question so that the witness can testify that the person "appeared drunk" rather than "was drunk", but most judges are not going to insist on meticulous form, especially where the objection does nothing but slow down the proceeding, particularly on a Friday afternoon.

In this case, because the witness had already testified that the defendant drove her car into her, and because cars tend not to move except by someone stepping on the gas pedal, and because this is obviously within the everyday experience of a lay witness, particularly one in Southern California, it was clearly permissible lay opinion.

The objection was overruled.

Monday, December 19, 2005

Outline - Criminal Law - XI - Trial Process

Criminal Law (2005 Fall)

XI. TRIAL PROCESS

  1. Evidence
    1. Evidence that is relevant is admissible only if it is:
      1. Probative
      2. Material
    2. Evidence that is relevant but inadmissible
      1. Privilege
        1. Patient/doctor
        2. Attorney/client
        3. Priest/penitent
        4. Spouse
        5. Self-incrimination
      2. Hearsay [Krulewitch – Prostitution conspiracy]
      3. Prejudice [Zackowitz – Character evidence inadmissible unless defense makes character an issue; psychological profiles or reputations in rape cases.]
    3. Evidence that is relevant but limited in admissibility
      1. Rule 404(b) – Evidence of prior crimes may be used for proof of motive, opportunity, intent, etc., but not for establishing character.
      2. Signature exception – Where prior crimes establish a “signature”, preponderance of evidence is sufficient.
      3. Sex offenses – Evidence of prior offense admissible unless prejudicial.
      4. Impeachment – If defense makes character an issue, character evidence admissible.
  2. Burden of Proof
    1. Reasonable doubt
    2. Preponderance for affirmative defense
    3. Allocation
      1. Normally state bears burden of production (putting an issue in play) and burden of persuasion (convincing the trier of fact).
      2. State may not shift burdens to defendant by making an element’s converse an affirmative defense. [Patterson/Mullaney]
    4. Presumptions
      1. Conclusive [Sandstrom – Conclusive not okay]
      2. Mandatory
      3. Permissible
      4. Rebuttable
  3. Role of Counsel
    1. Perjury

      Nix v. Whiteside – If defendant wants to commit perjury, counsel must choose between free narrative, and thread of disclosure.

    2. Impeachment of prosecution witnesses